Making moves matter: Experimental evidence on incentivizing bureaucrats through performance-based postings

Adnan Khan; Asim Khwaja

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Източник - периодично издание: The American Economic Review
Година на издаване: 2019
Пор.№: 1
Страници: pp. 237 - 270
Том: 109
Ключови думи: полеви експерименти, бюрокрация, обществени организации, държавни данъци, местни данъци, публичен сектор, неформален сектор, икономика в сянка

ISSN: 0002-8282
Забележка: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180277
Системен №: 75199
Website: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20180277

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Khan, A., Khwaja, A. Making moves matter: Experimental evidence on incentivizing bureaucrats through performance-based postings. 2019 pp. 237 - 270,.

Khan, A., Khwaja, A. (2019) Making moves matter: Experimental evidence on incentivizing bureaucrats through performance-based postings, pp. 237 - 270,.

Khan, A., & Khwaja, A. (2019). Making moves matter: Experimental evidence on incentivizing bureaucrats through performance-based postings. pp. 237 - 270.

Khan A, Khwaja A. Making moves matter: Experimental evidence on incentivizing bureaucrats through performance-based postings. 2019. p. pp. 237 - 270.

Making moves matter: Experimental evidence on incentivizing bureaucrats through performance-based postings

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Corporate Governance