Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect

Hideshi Itoh; Hodaka Morita

ПВ 2377

Източник: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Година на издаване: 2015
Страници: pp. 318 - 346
Том: 7
Ключови думи: теория на игрите, организационно поведение, теория на договарянето

Itoh, Hideshi, Morita, Hodaka Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect, , 2015, pp. 318 - 346.

Itoh, Hideshi, Morita, Hodaka . Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect. : , 2015, pp. 318 - 346.

Itoh, Hideshi, Morita, Hodaka (2015) Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect, : , pp. 318 - 346

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